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IN THE COURT ••:• APPEALS ~* THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plai n h t f /RpMpondPnt , 
v. 
JAMES ACE MOREHOUSE, 
D e f' e n d a n t / App e 11 a n t, 
Case No. 860193-CA 
Cateqory No, 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Tht otcitt-MiK-iil il I'S^ije, -I 11 ,* t pmp fi t of the case a r e s e t 
fortF »n Br ie f of A p p e l l a n t a t pages 111 anu i i IJ<J /i[»pe i Iriin \ i K * 
oor *•'! n J t y t o r e p l y t o a p o r t i o n ot P o i n t i l of R e s p o n d e n t s 
Brief, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. MR. MOREHOUSE WAS DENIED HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
WHERE DEFENSE COUNSEL FAILED TO MOVE TO SUPPRESS 
HIS PRIOR CONVICTIONS. 
(R^piy tin .1 [iuti ion of Respondent's Point I I . ,i 
In his opening briel. \^p* laid, conljunh^i t'h,il Mi. 
Morehouse was denied effective assistance z: counsel where counsel 
a . .i- . , * * *• oeuaube c: --r. without 
tir^f attempting r suppresb •  , Morehouse 
pursuant ^
 r Evidence (1983). 
" o i" 11 e n d e ci t h a I" M r . Morehouse's 
convictions might have been admissible under Hun,' MIM .I i in i 
appellant failed t, ~>! .»* P ^ I U ^ J v resulting from defense counsel's 
failure to make a r r.urtiuiiM (Respondent's 
Brief at 10-13). -* < contentions dr*r without merit. 
Rule 609(a)(1), Utah Rules of Evidence (1983) allows prior 
convictions to be admissible as evidence to attack the credibility 
of a witness only if the crime is a felony and the court determines 
that the probative value of the evidence of the conviction outweighs 
its prejudicial effect. In State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 
1986), decided shortly after the trial in this case, the Utah 
Supreme Court clarified the language of Rule 609(a)(1) by specifying 
five factors which are to be considered when balancing probative 
value against prejudicial effect. The five factors are: 
[1] the nature of the crime, as bearing on the character 
for veracity of the witness. 
[2] the recentness or remoteness of the prior conviction 
• • • 
[3] the similarity of the prior crime to the charged 
crime, insofar as a close resemblance may lead the jury to 
punish the accused as a bad person. 
[4] the importance of credibility issues in determining 
the truth in a prosecution tried without decisive 
nontestimonial evidence . . . 
[5] the importance of the accused's testimony as perhaps 
warranting the exclusion of convictions probative of the 
accused's character for veracity . . . 
Banner, supra at 1334. 
Rule 609 (a)(2) permits impeachment through the use of 
crimes involving dishonesty or false statement. 
The Utah Supreme Court adopted the new rules of evidence, 
including Rule 609, on April 13, 1983; such rules became effective 
on September 1, 1983 and governed the trial in the present case. 
The new rules of evidence were patterned substantially after the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and Rule 609(a) was adopted verbatim from 
the federal rules. See footnote 6 and accompanying text of Boyce, 
Utah Rules of Evidence 198J3, 85 Utah L. Rev. 64. 
The Committee which promulgated the rules stated/ "The 1983 
Utah Rules of Evidence. . . supplant the 1971 Rules and all other 
inconsistent statutes or rules".1 As the Court pointed out in State 
v. Grayf 717 P.2d 1313/ 1334'(1986) "[t]he preliminary committee 
note to Utah's new Rules of Evidence states that the rules are to 
provide a fresh starting place for the law of evidence in this 
state." The Gray court acknowledged that: 
Since the advisory committee generally sought to 
achieve uniformity between Utah's rules and the 
federal rules, this Court looks to the 
interpretations of the federal rules by the 
federal courts to aid in interpreting the Utah 
rules. 
State v. Gray# supra at 1333. 
The federal courts are not in complete agreement on what 
constitutes "dishonesty or false statement"/ under 609(a)(2) but the 
better reasoned cases strongly indicate that burglary and theft are 
not crimes of dishonesty or false statement.2 In United States v. 
Smith/ 551 F.2d 348 (D.C. Cir. 1976)/ which the Utah Supreme Court 
cited in the State v. Banner/ supra/ the circuit court discussed in 
detail the legislative history of Rule 609(a) pointing out the 
heated debate which spawned the formulation of the rule. The Smith 
court quoted the Conference Committee Report which stated: 
By the phrase "dishonesty and false statement" 
the Conference means crimes such as perjury or 
subornation of perjury, false statement/ criminal 
fraud/ embezzlement/ or false pretense/ or any 
1
 See footnote 6 and accompanying text of Boyce, Utah 
Rules of Evidence 1983f 85 Utah L. Rev. 64. 
2
 See generally/ annot. Rule 609(a)(2): Convictions 
Admissible; Crimes Involving Dishonesty/ 39 ALR Fed. 596 
§15. 
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other offense in the nature of crimen falsi/ the 
commission of which involves some element of 
deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing 
on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully. 
United States v. Smith/ supra at 362/ (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
93-1597/ 93d Cong./ 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in [1974] U.S. code Cong. 
& Admin. Newsf pp. 6098/ 7103). Footnote 26 of the Smith opinion 
discussed in detail the history of crimen falsi suggesting that 
burglary or theft related crimes would not qualify under the crimen 
falsi designation. United States v. Smith/ supra at 362-63. 
Another opinion from the same circuit gave further light on 
Congress1 intent in drafting Rule 609(a)(2). In United States v. 
Millings/ 535 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1976)/ the court reasoned: 
An intent to deceive or defraud is not an element 
of either offense. . . . Certainly we cannot say 
that either offense, in the language of the 
Conference Committee/ is "peculiarly probative of 
credibility." Although it may be argued that any 
willful violation of law. . . evinces a lack of 
character and a disregard for all legal duties, 
including the obligations of an oath/ Congress 
has not accepted that expansive theory. 
United States v. Millings/ supra at 123. The clear intent of 
Congress was to limit the introduction of prior convictions for 
impeachment purposes only to those crimes which bear directly on a 
witness1 propensity to not tell the truth. Otherwise/ one could 
argue, as discounted in Millings, that any crime could be introduced 
to impeach. As the Millings court stated, Congress did not intend 
to adopt such an expanded position. 
In United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1982), 
the court held that the crimes of burglary and grand theft were not 
admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) without a showing of accompanying 
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fraudulent or deceitful conduct. The burden rests with the State to 
make such a showing. Generally, the court observed that crimes of 
violence, theft crimes, and crimes of stealth do not involve 
dishonesty or false statement within the proper meaning of Rule 
609(a)(2). 
In United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir. 
1978), the court stated that dishonesty and false statement does not 
include convictions for burglary or robbery since the terms are used 
in a restrictive manner and are limited to those prior convictions 
which manifest deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification which would 
demonstrate that the accused would be likely to testify untruthfully. 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit held that a prior conviction 
for felony theft could not be used for impeachment purposes under 
Rule 609(a)(2) because a prior theft does not bear upon a witness's 
propensity to testify truthfully. The court stated that felony 
theft does not involve dishonesty or false statement of the 
credibility—deteriorating quality contemplated by Rule 609(a)(2). 
Howard v. Gonzales, 658 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1981). Hence, crimes of 
burglary or theft are not crimes of dishonesty or false statement 
within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2). 
Rule 609(b) sets a time limit on the age of prior 
convictions for determining admissibility. It provides: 
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under 
this rule is not admissible if a period of more 
than ten years has elapsed since the date of the 
conviction or of the release of the witness from 
the confinement imposed for that conviction, 
whichever is the later date, unless the court 
determines, in the interests of justice, that the 
probative value of the conviction supported by 
specific facts and circumstances substantially 
outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, 
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evidence of a conviction more than ten years old 
as calculated herein, is not admissible unless 
the proponent gives to the adverse party 
sufficient advance written notice of intent to 
use such evidence to provide the adverse party 
with a fair opportunity to contest the use of 
such evidence. 
In the present case, Mr. Morehouse's prior convictions 
consisted of Burglary (1964), Burglary and Theft (1973), Possession 
of Controlled Substance (1976), Possession of a Weapon by Restricted 
Person (1972) and Driving Under the Influence (1982) (R. 1088, 
1135-1136). Mr. Morehouse went to prison in 1976 on a parole 
violation for the 1973 burglary and theft charges and was released 
in 1978 (Re 1135-1136). 
Prior to trial, Mr. Morehouse indicated to defense counsel 
that he would like to testify on his own behalf; however, defense 
counsel advised him not to because he believed that if "he chose to 
take the stand, [he] would be required to respond not only as to the 
fact of his prior convictions, but as to the number and nature (R. 
1084-1085, 1108-1109). Defense counsel testified that he believed 
that the number of prior convictions would make it impossible "to 
make [Mr. Morehouse] presentable to the jury" (R. 1108). Defense 
counsel advised Mr. Morehouse not to testify without investigating 
any pretrial or trial motion to exclude the prior convictions (R. 
1109). 
Because of his misunderstanding of Rule 609 and failure to 
file a motion to suppress Mr. Morehouse's convictions, defense 
counsel conceded that he was negligent in advising Mr. Morehouse not 
to testify (R. 1115) . 
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Had defense counsel understood Rule 609 and made the 
appropriate motion to suppress Mr. Morehouse's prior convictions, 
the 1964 conviction for Burglary and the 1972 Restricted Person 
conviction should have been summarily suppressed as being too remote 
pursuant to the ten year rule in 609 (b).3 
The 1982 conviction for Driving Under the Influence was not 
a felony and therefore did not fall under Rule 609(a)(1); in 
addition, the Driving Under the Influence conviction did not involve 
dishonesty or false statement and therefore would not have been 
admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). Hence, had defense counsel moved 
to suppress Mr. Morehouse's prior convictions, the 1982 DUI 
conviction would have been inadmissible at trial. 
The 1976 Possession of Controlled Substance conviction did 
not involve dishonesty or false statement; thus Section (a)(2) was 
not applicable. Had defense counsel moved to suppress the 
conviction, the Court would have balanced the probative value 
against the prejudicial effect under Rule 609(a)(1) in determining 
whether the conviction should be admitted. Even absent the 
guidelines for balancing clarified in Banner, defense counsel could 
J
 The State filed no notice of intent to rely on these convictions 
as required by Rule 609(b). However, even if the state had filed 
such a notice, the Court would be put in a position of balancing the 
probative value against the prejudicial effect as required by Rule 
609(b). Since both charges have very little probative value but a 
large potential prejudicial effect, the possibility that the Court 
would permit admission of such convictions (had a motion to suppress 
and notice of intent to rely been filed) is slim. See discussion 
infra re balancing probative value against prejudicial effect. At 
the hearing on the motion for new trial in this case, the trial 
judge indicated he probably would not have allowed the prosecutor to 
ask about either of these charges (R. 1132, 1137). 
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make a strong argument that the prejudicial effect of such a 
conviction outweighed any minimal probative value. The factors set 
forth in Banner are factors which should be considered as part of 
any such balancing regardless of whether the Utah Supreme Court had 
previously specifically enumerated them. 
Possession of Controlled Substance does not reflect on the 
character for veracity of a witness and therefore was of minimal or 
no probative value. The conviction was almost ten years old and 
therefore of limited probative value. While possession of 
controlled substance is not a crime similar to arson, it has 
substantial prejudicial effect due to the current concern, focus and 
negative implications of drug charges in this society. As defense 
counsel clarified, Mr. Morehouse's testimony was critical in 
establishing his whereabouts for a half hour period not covered by 
his alibi witnesses (R. 1110, 1119-1120). Mr. Morehouse's 
credibility was essential or his testimony would have had little 
impact. In balance, the prejudicial effect of such conviction far 
outweighed its probative value and therefore the court probably 
would not have admitted the conviction. 
The only remaining conviction was the 1973 burglary and 
theft conviction. In 1976, Mr. Morehouse's parole on that charge 
was revoked and he was incarcerated until 1978. At the motion for 
new trial hearing, counsel for Appellant argued that the conviction 
fell outside the ten year limit of Rule 609(b) since Mr. Morehouse 
was released "from the confinement imposed for that conviction'' more 
than ten years prior to trial and that the 1978 release was from a 
parole violation rather than the confinement initially imposed. 
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Assuming this court determines otherwise and finds that the 
1976 burglary and theft conviction fall within the ten year limit of 
Rule 609(b), 609(a)(1) and 609(a)(2) are applicable in determining 
whether the conviction would have been admissible. 
Pursuant to the balancing test set forth in Rule 609(a)(1), 
the trial court probably would not have admitted the conviction. As 
outlined above, the federal courts are not in complete agreement as 
to what types of crimes constitute dishonesty and false statement. 
However, the better view, based upon legislative history and 
decisions from various circuits is that burglary and theft crimes 
are not crimes of dishonesty and have minimal, if any, relevance in 
determining the veracity of a witness. 
Even if the crime falls within the ten year rule due to the 
parole violation, the remoteness of the conviction—ten years prior 
to trial—makes it of minimal probative value. 
While arson is a distinct crime from burglary or theft, 
according to a witness in the present case, someone did enter the 
building through a window shortly before the second fire erupted. 
The similarity between this entry and a "traditional" burglary could 
lead the jury to decide Mr. Morehouse was experienced at entering 
buildings illegally, or otherwise punish Mr. Morehouse for being a 
"bad person." Hence, admitting evidence of this charge could 
prejudice the jury. 
As previously outlined, credible testimony by Mr. Morehouse 
to fill in a half hour gap in his alibi was critical to this case 
(R. 1110, 1119-1120). The prosecutor focused on that gap in his 
closing argument and, in a case such as this where the evidence of 
arson and the evidence linking Mr. Morehouse to the alleged crime 
- 9 -
was minimal,the testimony by Mr. Morehouse explaining his 
whereabouts and actions would have been critical (See Appellant's 
Brief, Point I at 6-12). 
Hence, the 1973 burglary and theft conviction was of 
minimal probative value and highly prejudicial; therefore, had a 
motion to suppress been filed, the trial court likely would not have 
admitted the 1973 conviction for burglary and theft under Rule 
609(a)(1). 
Whether the trial court would have admitted the conviction 
under Rule 609(a)(2) is less clear; however, had defense counsel 
moved to suppress the conviction, a persuasive argument that it was 
inadmissible under this subsection existed. 
The Utah Supreme Court decided State v. Cintron, 680 P.2d 
33 (Utah 1984) in 1984. Cintron was a per curiam opinion under Rule 
21, the applicable rule of evidence in effect prior to the adoption 
of Rule 609. In Cintron, the Court briefly concluded that theft 
impliedly involves dishonesty and therefore is admissible for 
impeachment purposes under Rule 21. 
However, the Cintron opinion did not involve Rule 609, did 
not therefore rely on the legislative history surrounding Rule 609 
or the decisions from various circuits which, as outlined above, 
suggest that burglary and theft crimes are not crimes of 
dishonesty. The committee note promulgating the current rules of 
evidence and subsequent case law clarify that the new rules of 
evidence were a fresh starting place. Hence, any reliance on 
Cintron in deciding whether a burglary and/or theft is a crime of 
dishonesty under Rule 609 is misplaced. 
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As previously outlined, the better view is that burglary 
and theft are not crimes of dishonesty under 609(a)(2) and 
therefore, had a motion to suppress been filed, defense counsel 
could have briefed the matter and made a strong argument that the 
conviction was inadmissible under that rule.4 
Even if the trial court had admitted the burglary and theft 
convictions under Rule 609(a)(2), defense counsel would have been 
better able to evaluate his decision as to whether Mr. Morehouse 
should testify. Defense counsel expressed concern at the number of 
convictions on Mr. Morehouse's record. Defense counsel inaccurately 
believed that if Mr. Morehouse testified, he would have to answer to 
all felonies (R. 1084-1085, 1108). Had defense counsel understood 
Rule 609 and made the appropriate motion to suppress, at best, one 
conviction which was ten years old would have been admitted. A 
single, ten year old conviction does not present the same problems 
in "making a defendant presentable" to the jury as several 
convictions do. Even if the single conviction were admitted, 
defense counsel likely would have reevaluated his decision and 
permitted Mr. Morehouse to testify due to the remoteness of the 
conviction and the importance of Morehouse's testimony. 
As Appellant argued in his opening brief, Mr. Morehouse was 
prejudiced by defense counsel's misunderstanding of Rule 609. In 
4 The trial judge indicated at the motion for new trial hearing that 
he would have considered the 1973 Burglary and Theft conviction a 
crime of dishonesty and admitted it pursuant to Rule 609(a)(2). 
However, at the new trial motion, defense counsel conceded that he 
had not researched whether burglary is a crime of dishonesty and the 
court made its decision without benefit of briefing (R. 1094-1095). 
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United States v. Butts, 630 F. Supp. 1145 (D.Me. 1986), the court 
pointed out that where ineffective assistance of counsel deprives a 
defendant of his right to testify, "prejudice is sufficiently 
proven, if not to be presumed from, the resulting denial of the 
defendant's right to testify." Id. at 1149. Such presumption of 
prejudice is reasonable since the testimony of a defendant in a 
criminal trial is of "prime importance" (Id.), and in the typical 
case where the defendant does not take the stand, the record will be 
silent as to what the defendant would have said and proof of 
prejudice therefore difficult. 
However, in the present case, the record as to what the 
defendant would have said had he testified is not silent. Defense 
counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that 
Mr. Morehouse would have testified as to his whereabouts and actions 
during the hour before the fire was set (R. 1110). At trial, the 
prosecutor had effectively cross-examined the alibi witnesses, 
attempting to show that their time frame was in error. He argued to 
the jury that a gap of half an hour to an hour existed between the 
last time Mr. Morehouse was seen at the bar and the time of the fire 
(R. 1018-1021, 1119-1120). Hence, Mr. Morehouse's testimony would 
have done more than merely corroborate the alibi testimony. It 
would have established his whereabouts throughout the evening and 
given the jury a first hand account of his claims of innocence. 
In a close case such as this, where evidence supporting the 
charge against the defendant is minimal, a single error of this 
magnitude, resulting in a deprivation of the defendant's right to 
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testify, amounts to the type of prejudice contemplated in Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and its progeny. 
CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, and all of the reasons set 
forth in his opening brief, Appellant, James Ace Morehouse, asks 
this Court to reverse his conviction and remand his case to the 
District Court for a new trial or dismissal of the charges. 
Respectfully submitted this u day of July, 1987. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Appellant 
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JOAN C. WATT 
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